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The normative trap in ethnopolitical research 
 
Daniel Bochsler and Basil Schläpfer 
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Research on ethnic politics deals with politically and socially highly sensitive issues. In this 
rejoinder, we discuss how research should deal with political and social norms in this field. 
We agree with Cooley and Mujanović that researchers should be aware of political and social 
norms, should try to avoid possible biases, and discuss how their data and results might 
influence  politics and the public debate. We warn against any practice that would lead to 
self-censorship of research results that conflict with the dominant normative views of scholars 
or society. 
The debate about ethnic identification touches upon a highly politicised issue. In Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, this has lead to years of delay in conducting and publishing the first post-
war population census in the country. Our data – distinguishing between four categories 
Bosniak, Croats, Serbs and a residual category named ‘Others’ – allows for academic research 
on topics where these identities matter. In their reply to our work, Cooley and Mujanović 
point out that our results could be “co-opted by political actors for their own purposes”, 
possibly even by nationalist parties.  
Their argument is related to the normative discussion about whether and how ethnic 
identity distributions in the population should be reported. Certainly, there is no generally 
accepted model of ethnic relations which would inform us about ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ identities. 
Even advanced industrial democracies differ tremendously in how states and societies relate 
to their members: since the 1970s the cultural model of the United States and Canada has built 
on its ethnic communities (Kymlicka 1995, 14-5). In contrast, the French ‘republican’ model 
is blind to ethnicity, all citizens are viewed as French above all. In this view, any distinction 
by identity would divide and discriminate between equal citizens (Jennings 2000). 
 
Addressing the empirical critique 
Regardless of these ideological debates, for empirical research dealing in ethnopolitics and 
migration studies data on ethnic identities and/or migration background is indispensible. 
Politics and society will never learn about discriminatory practices against members of certain 
groups in society if they consider identity groups as a taboo. Hänni (forthcoming) has 
conducted a worldwide comparative study, in order to measure the impact of political 
representation on the political alienation of ethnic minorities. She also would have liked to 
measure to what extent Basques and Corsicans are represented in French politics, and whether 
this leads to their political alienation. However, the French parliament does not publish any 
data on the identity or origins of its members, nor do opinion polls conducted in France ask 
questions about identities. This does not mean that no discrimination is practised. However, a 
society, which considers group identities as a taboo will also be unable to discover if citizens 
with minority backgrounds are treated unequally. 
In post-war societies, ethnicity tends to be an important, if not the most politically salient 
social category. Hiltmann (2015) has relied on our data in order to study the success of 
refugee return programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the returns depend on the ethnic 
context, reliable information on ethnicities is indispensible for any positivist research in this 
field (for further research questions, see our previous article). 
Cooley and Mujanović write that our estimation “uncritically accept[s] the Bosnian state’s 
preferred identity categories” (insert page number). As our critics, we would welcome data 
which goes beyond over-simplistic ethnic categories, and instead provides nuanced 
information about multiple layers of identity. Unfortunately, there is no such data on the first 
two post-war decades in Bosnia and Herzegovina. True, the simplistic political categories, 
which we use in our research, are only worth considering if they enhance our understanding 
of social processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And true, ethnic maps of the country might be 
used as a legitimisation of the state policies. However, while politicians fight over the official 
census results, we can publish results (and discuss the underlying methodology critically). So 
far as we can judge, our estimations will not get the same political recognition, and are 
therefore less sensitive. However, they can be used for academic purposes. 
We consider that our estimation matches the identities which matter in social and political 
life in Bosnia and Herzegovina better than any previous numbers. Cooley and Mujanović state 
that their "intention [...] is not to question the particular method" (p. XXX), but they are 
suspicious that the nature of the data might lead to a bias towards the politically dominant 
group. We were also concerned with this issue: we have even reported qualitative evidence 
(kindly shared with us by Elena Stavrevska) in support of Cooley and Mujanović’s concern in 
our article. As multiple validity tests showed, the effect is small.1 The official categories 
match the identities which matter for social and political life very well. In a survey conducted 
in 2005, only 1.5 percent of a representative sample of respondents did not identify either as 
                                                 
1 Under this hypothesis, dominant groups should be over-represented in our data. This would not only imply a 
homogeneous effect of under-representation of ‘Others’ across all municipalities, but also that in each 
municipality, the largest group would be over-represented in our estimation.  
Bosniak (Muslim), Serb or Croat (O'Loughlin 2010, 29). The desire to have more nuanced 
data is thus rather driven by normative than by empirical motives. 
 
Addressing the normative critique 
Normative ideals about (non-)ethnic relations in societies differ widely. In our 
understanding, empirical research tries to echo normative debates with related evidence, 
although not necessarily with the goal of taking any normative stances on issues. Cooley and 
Mujanović write that “new kinds of political movements” leave ethnic categories behind, and 
thus pursue “a better, more just social order” (cite page numbers). In their view, societies 
should not be organised along ethnic lines, and thus research on ethnic politics is not needed. 
In brief, they recommend the  study of ‘good’ movements (e.g. workers’ unions, pro-
democracy, etc.), and not ‘evil’ ones (e.g. fascism, nationalists), and/or their consequences.2 
Academic research does not provide a clear normative answer about using ethnic 
identities for research. As Kymlicka (1995) convincingly argues, group identities can also be 
seen as a constituting part of society. 
Of course, the political agenda to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina between the three 
constituent groups has left a horrible scar on Bosnian society, including atrocities aimed at 
erasing Bosniak life from Eastern Bosnia. Against this background, Cooley and Mujanović’s 
raise valid concerns about the use of the politically recognised identity categories. However, 
other non-ethnic categories are also politically constructed. Historically, they have been used 
to weaken the position of the Serbs and/or Croats, and empowered positions which are 
supported by Bosniak nationalist parties (Bochsler 2012, 70). In the course of the transition 
from socialism, political quotas included not only Bosniaks,3 Serbs, Croats, but also a quota 
for all ‘others’, not belonging to the three group. The wartime representative in the 
government of ‘Others’, Ejup Ganić, later on joined the Party of Democratic Action, the 
nationalist party of the Bosniaks. Since the end of the war, the Bosnia has had a three-member 
presidency composed by a Bosniak, a Croat, and a Serb. The Croat member of the presidency 
of 2006-2014, Željko Komšić, won votes primarily from places where voters would hardly 
describe themselves as Croats, and who share their political positions on state issues with the 
Bosniak parties. While vote-pooling across ethnic lines can support candidates and parties 
which stand for moderation on ethnic issues, in this case it has raised fears among Croats and 
Serbs that their interests might be marginalised in the political process. In their perception, the 
agenda to abandon the rigid, corporatist character of the Bosnian consociation aims at 
                                                 
2 For future research, an online appendix distinguishing good from evil might be helpful. 
3 Pre-1993 addressed as Muslims. 
depriving minorities their political rights and protection. Consequentially, it does not  strike us 
as surprising that in surveys, almost all respondents identifying as “Bosnian citizens” also 
identify as Bosniaks, but hardly any of them as ethnic Croats or ethnic Serbs (O'Loughlin 
2010, 29).  
There are also empirical and realist arguments in support of a political order which is not 
entirely blind to ethnic categories. Theoretically, McCrudden and O’Leary (2013, 132-7) 
explain why peace agreements ending ethnic wars are only possible by recognising ethnic 
identities, and guaranteeing power to the political elites of ethnic groups. Some empirical 
evidence suggests that political and territorial separation along ethnic lines reduces the 
likelihood of future conflict and inter-ethnic violence (Sambanis 2000; Bhavani et al. 2014).4 
We dare not judge whether deeply entrenched ethnic divisions, or instead the denial of salient 
identities might be more dangerous and lead to new violence in the long-run. 
 
Avoiding ideological self-censorship 
Last but not least, Cooley and Mujanović warn that ethnic population statistics might 
serve "primarily to satisfy our own intellectual curiosity, rather than for emancipatory 
purposes". In brief, they object that the ethnic lens through which we seek to analyse politics 
in does not fit into the normative canon of the discipline, and of society in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Academics should rather "reflect on role of power and politics in [their] 
research, however well intended it might be" (p. XXX). 
This clashes with our understanding of social science research. Many of our research 
questions might be motivated by normative goals, but we are also open to accept and publish 
results which do not fit the ideological mainstream of society and/or our academic peers. 
After all, ethnicity might turn out to be irrelevant to the understanding of social processes (as 
might be other politically sensitive categories, e.g. gender, race, religion, abilities, etc.). If we 
were to refrain from asking questions about such categories, we would never find out.  
Empirical research qualifies as scientific because it makes its procedures and data 
transparent, and accepts the results even though they might be used by political actors, who 
we personally do not sympathise with. If we are not willing to accept this we cast doubt upon 
one of the most important good, which we have as academics: credibility. 
 
                                                 
4 Results remain controversial. 
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